The figure that gets quoted, in every consultant deck and analyst
report, is that sixty-five percent of ERP projects fail. The figure
is roughly correct. The interesting question is not whether ERP
rollouts fail, but when. The answer is the first ninety days. By the
time the project formally goes live, the failure has usually already
happened. Go-live is the moment the failure becomes visible to the
founder, not the moment it was caused.
This essay is the pattern. Five symptoms that show up early, all of
which are detectable before the contract is signed, and the
diagnostic a founder can run on a vendor before committing.
The operational map nobody drew
The most common cause of a ninety-day failure is that nobody wrote
down how the business actually runs before the system was scoped.
The vendor demoed the standard ERP. The founder watched the demo and
recognised parts of it. The contract got signed. The configuration
began. Six weeks in, the implementation team started asking
questions like, how does your firm handle a partial dispatch where
the customer changes the destination address mid-route, and the
answer turned out to be different in every branch.
The operational map is the document that should exist before the
ERP is selected. Who does what, in what sequence, with what
exceptions, against what record. A factory floor's actual workflow
rarely matches the demo's idealised one. The gap between the two is
where customisation cost lives, and customisation cost compounds
fast.
The firms that get this right spend two to four weeks documenting
the operation before the vendor enters the room. The documentation
is not glossy. It is a notebook, a whiteboard photo, and a series of
sit-downs with the team. It is the same diagnostic phase that
appears in our approach work, because the diagnostic
saves more money than any negotiation on price.
Change management treated as a memo
The second pattern. The founder announces the new system in a
meeting. The team receives the news. The vendor's trainer arrives on
the go-live week. Two days of training are conducted. The system
goes live the following Monday. Three weeks later, the team has
quietly reverted to the spreadsheets they always used, and the new
system runs in parallel with nobody inputting anything beyond what
the founder personally checks.
Change management is not a memo. It is the daily reinforcement, by
someone the team respects, that the new system is the only system.
It is the senior operations head sitting with the team for the first
month and answering questions in real time. It is the founder
visibly closing the old shortcuts. It is the recognition that the
old workflow has muscle memory that the new system has to displace,
and displacement takes longer than training.
We saw the pattern starkly during the
Carbiforce, Metaldur, and Kawacut build.
The shared owners of the three brands committed personally to the
floor visits for the first sixty days. Adoption stabilised in week
ten. Without that commitment, the adoption curve would have flattened
at thirty percent and the project would have joined the sixty-five
percent.
The big-bang go-live
The third failure pattern is the decision to move every workflow on
the same day. Sales, inventory, purchase, finance, payroll, customer
portal, all live on the same Monday. The reasoning is usually that
running parallel systems for too long is exhausting, and that a
clean break forces adoption.
The reasoning is wrong. The clean break is also a clean failure
surface. Any one workflow that breaks brings the whole rollout into
question. The team loses confidence in the system. The founder loses
confidence in the vendor. The recovery takes months.
The pattern that works is a staged rollout against a sequence the
business can absorb. Inventory and purchase first. Sales and
quotation next. Customer portal and dashboards last. Each stage runs
for four to six weeks before the next one begins. The team builds
confidence on small wins. The founder sees value early. The vendor
learns the firm's exceptions on workflows where the stakes are
contained, before applying the learning to the high-stakes
workflows.
The ES Haji industrial ERP is the
example we point to. RFQ and vendor coordination went live first.
Quotations and purchase order workflows followed. Customer and vendor
dashboards came in the next stage. Tally integration closed the loop
last. Every stage had a working previous stage to fall back on.
The vendor handoff at go-live
The fourth pattern. The vendor's implementation team ships the
system and disappears. The handoff is to a customer success
representative whose job is ticket triage. The questions that come
up in week three of live operation, the unexpected exceptions, the
small bugs that compound into team frustration, have nowhere to land.
The vendor's response time is measured in days.
This is the structural problem with treating ERP as a product
purchase rather than a system commission. The product purchase ends
at delivery. The system commission is a multi-year relationship. The
firms that succeed treat the implementation team and the long-term
support team as the same team, with the same context, available on
the same channels the founder uses to reach his own staff.
A founder evaluating vendors should ask, literally, who will I be
talking to in month four, and how fast will they respond. If the
answer involves a ticket queue, the rollout has a higher chance of
joining the sixty-five percent. The longer treatment of this point
sits in
our essay on three years of one system.
The decision-maker who went on holiday
The fifth pattern is the most preventable. The founder, exhausted by
the build-up to go-live, books a holiday for the first two weeks of
live operation. The team encounters its first unexpected situation
on day three. The decision required is small but only the founder
can make it. The team waits. The work-around becomes the workflow.
By the time the founder returns, the work-around has become muscle
memory, and the system's intended path is permanently bypassed.
The founder must be available for the first thirty days of live
operation. Not in a supervisory sense, in a decision-making sense.
The questions that arrive in those days set the operational pattern
that the system will run on for years. The cost of being absent for
those decisions is far larger than the cost of postponing the
holiday.
The diagnostic before the contract
Before a founder signs an ERP contract, the diagnostic that prevents
the ninety-day failure has five questions. Has the operational map
been drawn, in this firm, in writing. Who in the team has been
identified to carry the change management work for the first sixty
days. What is the staged rollout sequence and what does each stage
deliver. Who specifically, with name and phone number, is the
post-go-live point of contact in month four. Is the founder available
on-site for the first thirty days.
If any of the five answers is uncertain, the contract is not ready
to sign. The firm is buying a ninety-day failure at full price.
The work we do under the internal systems
practice is structured to prevent each of these patterns. The
diagnostic phase produces the operational map. The build phase
respects the staged rollout. The partnership phase is the same team
the firm met on day one, available in the months when the questions
matter most. Decision infrastructure is what the firm gets at the end.
The first ninety days are where it is decided whether the firm gets
there at all.
If you are within ninety days of an ERP decision and the diagnostic
above raises any uncertainty, the right next step is a conversation
before the contract, not after. Start a Conversation.